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WHAT CONSTITUTION ARE WE TALKING
ABOUT?
By GEN. HUGH S. JOHNSON*

There is great news in the morning papers. Roy Howard
wrote the President that there "is need to undo the damage
done by misinterpreters of the New Deal." He said that
many good men beg for a breathing spell for business in a
recess from further experimentation. He asked for repetition and reiteration of what the New Deal is and a smoking
out of the belief that an orderly modernization of government is not revolution in disguise.
That was a great letter. It expressed the anxious, prayerful wish of all the good and thoughtful men of my acquaintance regardless of party. And it received a great reply.
The President said he realized that a hectic Congress had
left some confusion. He briefly outlined the drastic legislative program which he had promised in 1932 and which the
nation, as you all remember, then demanded. He said he
thought it better to get the operation over soon and then
he said: "This program has now reached substantial completion. The breathing space of which you speak is herevery decidedly so."
* Address by Gen. Hugh S. Johnson, former head of the NRA, delivered
before the Indiana State Bar Association, September 6, 1935.
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What does that mean? I take it to mean no more experiments! It is time to consolidate gains. Lest there should be
any possible questions of the assurance given, the last paragraph of the President's letter repeats the last paragraph
of Mr. Howard's letter. It specifically endorses our American system and says:
"Smoke out the sinister forces seeking to delude the public
into believing that an orderly modernization of a system we
want to preserve is revolution in disguise."
If these words are accepted in the sincerity of their utterance, I believe that only one thing can stop a tremendous
business recovery-starting now.
Of course we can't have it if the forces of which both
letters speak succeed in fooling our people into believing that
there is in the present situation any danger to the system of
government ordained by the Constitution of the United
States.
The greatest danger to our country and the one thing that
can prevent recovery is unemployment. It is a stubborn
curse and it is not getting better.
The New York Times business index today stands at 90%
of normal. But there are as many people without jobs as
when that index stood at 70% of normal. There is no sign
of normal reemployment in this country.
Now that just won't work. You can't have recovery with

10,000,000 jobless breadwinners for something over 40,000,000 destitute people. That is 30% of our population. It
isn't in the cards.
I want to go a step further and say, after three years
intense concentration on this particular problem, that you
won't get those people to work without some kind of a Federal law under which hours of work are regulated. We must
have a shorter work week and it can't be done without a
Federal Statute.
The answer instantly given is-"you can't have such a
statute under the Constitutioni"
That brings us to a dead end and that is what I want to
talk about.

WHAT CONSTITUTION ARE WE TALKING ABOUT?

In all this clamor about the Constitution, let's give a
thought to what Constitution we are talking about. Is it
the document that was written in Philadelphia in the simplest
language that ever flowed from the pen of man for such a
purpose?
Is it somebody's medley, made up of a selected and conflicting judicial language?
In either case it would do no harm to go back to the
language and the history of the original document, to find
out what, during all their lives, was in the minds of the men
who made it. What was said about it by men on the Court
who were closer to its meaning than we can possibly be today.
Those may have been horse-and-buggy days, but it has
always been a matter of wonder to me that the statesmen of
those poor weak little thirteen colonies-a narrow fringe of
civilization on the edge of a howling wilderness of continental
extent-had always in their minds the making of a nation
extending from sea to sea-a single country spread across a
continent. They talked about and saw only one economic
unit unhampered by state lines obstructing its free commerce
and trade. They invented a national system, of which they
dreamed in terms of continental arteries of transportation on
land and water, extending from the Great Lakes to the Gulf
of Mexico, and from the Atlantic to the Pacific.
A curious by-path of history is the dream indulged by many
of our forefathers to extend our borders south to Panama.
That vision sticks its head up many times in early annals.
It was back of the so-called conspiracy of Aaron Burr. Old
Andy Jackson certainly knew about it. It was strong in
Confederate and British state-craft and had something to do
with the French occupation of Mexico.
Today we no longer think nationally to that extent. If
anybody suggests the broadening of our continental boundaries to make us more nearly self-contained, he is looked
upon as a nut. The only significance I see in this is that the
men who presided over our destinies in our first fifty years
had a mental approach from a purely national angle and I
think we must remember this when we are now asked to

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

believe that, by the Constitution they meant to impair the
power of the Federal government to deal with national problems nationally. It is inconsistent with all that they said or
wrote or did.
I want to know where in the Constitution of the United
States it says that the Congress may not pass a statute making
it unlawful to work men in our national industries more than
40 hours a week, or there to coin the youth and laughter and
labor of little children into greasy nickels, or to operate a
sweat-shop.
I would like to know where it says that, when an overwhelming majority of employers in a national industry, agree
that this or that practice in trade is destructive and unfair, the
Congress can't make a law ratifying that agreement and
putting a penalty on the 10% chiseling fringe that seeks to
profit by practices which the majority of their fellows say are
predatory and unfair.
You and I know that there are no such words in that great
charter. There are some such words in varying language of
theSupreme Court of the United States but there are other
words there, too, of a precisely opposite meaning.
Of course, the words of the Constitution are "the Congress
shall have power to regulate commerce among the several
states."
In a very early case a simple rule was laid down that
"whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national
*
* * require exclusive legislation by Congress."
I think an application of that rule would resolve all doubts
about the validity of such a law as NRA.
After all, isn't it just a question of fact, whether our great
industries have become so nationalized as to create a national
problem and to require regulation by national law?
To ask that question is to answer it. By far the bulk of
all our industry is national, not intrastate. Location of parts
of these great sprawling systems in particular states is simply
an accident. There is not an important corporation that does
not depend on our national market of 125 million people.

WHAT CONSTITUTION ARE WE TALKING ABOUT?

Look at a magazine like the Saturday Evening Post. It
owes its spectacular success to its character as a national
advertising medium. It is a great shop window for all the
people. Mass production-mass distribution-almost all of
the astonishing industrial advances of the past quarter century, are all dependent upon the fact that here in a nation
of continental extent-from ocean to ocean, and from almost
Arctic to almost tropical conditions-there are no outright
tariffs, boundaries, or other barriers to the free flow of trade.
That is well-all to the good. Freedom always is. But
here, if we are to follow such cases as the Sick Chicken Opinion which wrecked NRA, we go further. We go to the
length of saying that much of this vast national development
is subject to no law of God or man. That may sound like a
startling statement but it is literally and demonstrably true.
It would be utterly ridiculous to say that, as a matter of
practice, any state can effectively regulate any one of our
great national corporations. It can't do it physically because
only a small part of each is within any state. From a legal
standpoint, if any mere state attempted national regulation in
any appreciable degree impairing the utter freedom of such a
corporation in its interstate business, the Court would be
prompt in striking down that legislation.
But the effect of the dicta in the Schecter case is that our
national industries of construction, manufacture, mining and
agriculture may not be regulated by the nation either.
What a paradox is here if the states cannot regulate these
industrial giants for practical reasons, and that the nation
cannot regulate them for constitutional or legalistic reasons l
If that is true, it means that, between the practical inability of the states and the legalistic inability of the nation,
there is a vast zone of economic anarchy in which these great
national artificial persons can rape and ravish as they willand rape and ravish they do daily as the great revelations of
the NRA hearings amply showed.
Of course, that strange doctrine grew immediately out of
certain judicial interpretations of the Constitution. When,
with the anti-trust acts, the Federal government first under-
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took to take notice of the growing powers of these vast
national organisms, the Supreme Court uttered certain language and, from these few sentences, the whole theory arose
that manufacture by national corporations could not be regulated by the nation. In the Knight case, the Court said:
"Doubtless the power to control the manufacture of a
given thing involves in a certain sense the control of its disposition, but this is a secondary and not a primary sense; and
although the exercise of that power may result in bringing
the operation of commerce into play, it does not control it,
and affects it only incidentally and indirectly. Commerce succeeds to manufacture, and is not a part of it."
Now the word "Commerce" actually means any kind of
dealing between man and man. Legalistically we have much
restricted it and especially in later years. But it had no such
restricted meaning when the Constitution was written. "Commerce," said John Marshall, "is intercourse."
To say that manufacture is not "commerce" may be correct
enough but almost every part of manufacture is commerceand beyond any reasonable question, the relations between
workers and their employers is commerce between man and
man of the simplest sort. Certainly their negotiations and
contracts of employment are commerce.
But, says the Knight case, which drew nearly all the teeth
out of the anti-trust laws, manufacture affects commerce only
indirectly. From this one word "indirectly" and this dicta
that manufacture is not commerce, the whole doctrine is bred.
The classic definitions of these matters is, of course, in
Gibbons v. Ogden. So far as I know, nobody has ever contested or even qualified them. They said that commerce
among the states means commerce intermingled with the state
-not just the trading that reaches physically across the state
lines.
It has been frequently emphasized that they also said that
it did not mean commerce between man and man strictly internal to a state-and so they did-but what is never emphasized, that they emphatically qualified that statement by adding the words, "which does not affect other states."

WHAT CONSTITUTION ARE WE TALKING ABOUT?

The great Chief Justice did not say, "does not directly
affect interstate commerce." He said that the Federal power
must reach into the states to govern that commerce between
man and man which concerns more states than one or affects
other states.
Now that seems to me to be also a simple rule that should
settle the whole matter of such statutes as NRA. Is there,
in employment in manufacture, a commerce between man and
man within the several states but which does affect other
states, and which does violently and sometimes destructively
concern more states than one? If it does, is it not in its
nature national? If it is national, is any court going to
commit itself to the position of saying that the regulation of
that national concern of first magnitude is beyond the power
of either the state or nation-a No-Man's Land reached by
no system of laws?
That again is, of course, a pure question of simple fact. Is
there any necessity of a national rule? If there is, does
anybody seriously doubt its validity?
The great goldfish bowl of NRA brought into the public
gaze the curse of interstate chiseling on the wages of labor.
It revealed that a prime cause of the depression had been the
maldistribution of consuming power among workers, with an
effect that the tremendous industrial activity necessary to
support what we call prosperity, cannot be maintained unless
a sufficient reward for production is distributed among workers to enable them to consume the products of their own
hands.
It showed very clearly the power of one small chiseling
group in any state to degrade the wages and extend the hours
of all workers anywhere in the nation and in any particular
industry.
The labor cost of any product is a principal element of the
price of that product. When any locality or any small group
in any industry decides to gain in the competitive struggle by
reducing labor wages, it can so reduce its costs in that way
as to leave to the competitors in that industry-no matter
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how high minded-no choice but to follow the same practice,
or else to go out of business.
Now, this is a matter of primary national concern. It is
the single basic reason for the continuance of child labor. It
is the direct reason for the almost complete destruction of
profitable operation in the bituminous coal industry. It is
the only reason for the continuation of sweat-shop practices
in the garment industry.
Nobody knows the extent to which unemployment was increased in this country immediately after the destruction of
NRA, but it was very clear from thousands of reports in the
City of New York, and from conversation with some of the
greatest employers-that wages were reduced not less than
20% and hours increased by the same percentage. I know
of one great commercial enterprise in which 17,000 people
lost their jobs within a few days by reason of the destruction
of NRA.
As I had occasion to state in a speech about that time,
some national associations deliberately refrained from action
until Congress adjourned because they were fearful of the
public reaction, but they have taken that action with a vengeance since.
There is a school of thought in this country which apparently ardently believes, and belligerently maintains, that the
way to prosperity is to reduce wages on the theory that this
will make goods cheap and so increase consumption. Goods
may be cheap, but if the mass of the people have few jobs
and low wages, how can this country either produce or consume ?
Here are no less than 10 million people with no employment at all. They, with their dependents are at least onethird of the population of the United States. Much of
agriculture is still prostrate. Many of the rest of us are
on a part-time low income basis. How in such a situation
can you expect to keep the wheels of industry turning?
It can't be done. Private employment is the only possible
solution of our labor problems. We all think recovery is
coming. It is almost here. The New York Times index is
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90% of normal. But employment is not returning. I happen
to know about New York City. One-fifth of its population
is dependent on relief. Public works are not doing the job,
and will never do it. In my opinion the unemployment problem is worse than it ever has been and it can only be solved
by some revival of at least the basic principles of NRA.
Is this a problem in its nature national and requiring national attention or isn't it? It certainly is a problem of
commerce. To say otherwise is to stick our heads in the sand.
It is a national problem, if for no other reason than that
no separate state can even approach it. But at the risk of
repetition let me try to make that a little clearer. At the
same time let me address a few remarks to the "indirect"
effect of low wages in one locality or one state on the commerce of all localities, or all states.
The Japanese can and do buy American cotton, ship it
twice across the Pacific Ocean, and because in their manufacture they pay labor only a few cents a day, they can invade
our American markets, with their finished products, hopping
over a high tariff wall, and drive our textile industry into
bankruptcy, destroy the wealth and occupation of our capital,
labor and all the millions dependent on that industry.
Maybe that is an indirect effect of manufacture at low
wages in Japan on all wages in America, but it is commerce
between man and man in the State of Japan tragically effecting and concerning more states than one. The effect may be
indirect, but it is devastating. If we admit that the Constitution intended to set up some protection from destructive
evil, it is pretty hard to see why it would make any silly distinction between the direct and the indirect approach of it.
Common sense would say that it would regard the evil and
not the direction of its path.
In the particular case of Japan, our national system has
some degree of protection. It can raise the tariff wall, or
impose a definite embargo. But what shall we say of the
situation in New York City where, due to enlightened state
laws, and other economic decencies, sweat-shops cannot legally
be operated, or children enslaved.
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Yet, any chiseling little buzzard, if he wants to move across
a state line, as thousands have, can confront any New York
manufacturer with the choice of running a sweat-shop and
enslaving labor, or of going out of business. The effect of
outside sweat-shops on business in New York may be indirect
but I want to tell you that it is practically destroying light
manufacture in the City of New York.
Under this curious doctrine, what protection has New
York? It cannot lay any restrictions on the transportation
over its border line of the products of a Connecticut sweatshop. That is very clear in multitudinous decisions of the
Court. And now if the implications of the Schecter case are
to stand, the nation has no power and New York City has no
protection anywhere.
Is that a matter that concerns more states than one? Can
it be possible that there is no power, either in the state or
nation, to address this situation? If that is the case, then we
stand alone among all the nations of the world in having nowhere in our entire legal system the power to control and
regulate economic brigandage.
If I am right and it is all just a question of fact, as to
whether the commerce between man and man in industrial
employment concerns more states than one, I could give you
examples of whole national industries that have been ruined
by the process of local chiseling. I could show you case after
case of the prostration of an industry in one state by the wage
chiseling of that industry in another. The factual case for
national regulation under John Marshall's definitions is perfect and overwhelming.
The whole proposition just doesn't make sense. Let's go
back again to Constitutional history and ask: If there is any
such fundamental law, where did it come from?
If there was any one single thing clear in the calling of
the Constitutional Convention, it was that the purpose of it
was to break up a rapidly forming tendency of our commerce
to go into honeycomb compartments and to make that commerce national.

WHAT CONSTITUTION ARE WVE TALKING ABOUT.'

As John Marshall said of the result: "In commerce we
are one people."
The Articles of Confederation had proved a complete
failure. The states were getting ready to impose against each
other every conceivable kind of economic mayhem. Pennsylvania was considering a protective tariff law against all other
states. Some of the states were about to impose port duties
and embargoes.
The Northern states were engaged in the carrying trade.
The tie between the Southern states and the British market
for cotton, tea, indigo, rice and tobacco was very close. The
use of British bottoms to transport these vast raw resources,
threatened to frustrate the very purpose of the Revolution,
create strong economic bonds between Britain and the cotton
states, and ruin the North.
George Washington expressed the necessity in very em*phatic language:
"If the states individually attempt to regulate commerce, an
abortion or a many-headed monster would be the issue. If we consider
ourselves to be a united people, why not adopt the manners which are
characteristic of it?"

The Convention met with this as its primary purpose. To
my mind, one of the most astonishing conclusions is that there
grew out of that great Convention any theory that the Federal government had no power under that Constitution to
regulate the hours and conditions of labor in manufacture for
the national market. Gentlemen who insist on this seem to
forget the principal great compromise that made the Constitution possible.
We never have seemed to like to talk about it because it
involved the question of slavery. If any member of that Convention had entertained the thought that it was withholding
from Congress the power to regulate the conditions of labor
nationally, why should there have been a specific exception to
the power of Congress to interfere with'the institution of
slavery? To me, that single question seems devastating to
the contention that the authors of the Constitution ever
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dreamed that they were limiting the power of Congress over
this particular labor condition.
The compromise was just this: the South feared that the
power to regulate commerce might be used to abolish slavery.
It was unwilling to form a union on that basis. A trade was
finally worked out. The South gave to Congress the power
to regulate commerce in return for a specific condition that
it should not be used to interfere with slavery in the South.
Said Charles Pinckney in the Convention: "The power to
regulate commerce is a pure concession on the part of the
Southern States. They do not need the protection of the
Northern States."
The other Pinckney said: "It is to the true interest of the
Southern States to have no regulation of commerce, but considering the loss in the commerce of the Eastern States by
the Revolution and the liberal treatment of South Carolina
*

*

*

no fetters should be imposed on the power of

making commercial regulation."
Richard Henry Lee maintained the position throughout the
Convention that the commerce of the five southern agricultural states would be harmed by the regulation of commerce
to favor manufacture in the eight Northern States but at
length conceded that the fostering of manufacture by the
regulatory power of Congress over commerce was necessary
to create a nation. It was necessary then to create one, and
it is necessary now to save one.
In the face of all this evidence, against which there is not
a whisper to the contrary, that the commerce clause was
intended to give to Congress the power to address all national
economic problems nationally, it is very hard to accept any
such conclusion as even the Administration seemed to accept
after the Schecter case.
NRA could have been saved by a simple joint resolution
ratifying the codes by Congress and providing a period of,
say, nine months during which they should be revised by a
mechanism created in accordance with the formula laid down
by the Court. From the moment of utterance of the opinion
in the Schecter case, for about ten days, the future of the
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principle that the nation had the power to protect itself in
this regard hung in the balance.
There had been a vast sweep of changed sentiment throughout both industry and labor in favor of the codes. It was
for the President to decide whether he should ask Congress to
salvage the ruins of his greatest experiment, or whether he
should elect to let the ruins stand and leave the responsibility
with the Court for the frustration of high hope in both industry and labor. He chose the latter course. I thought it
was wrong, but his responsibilities are so much heavier than
those of any other man in this country that we cannot but
bow to his decision.
I do not, however, agree that the conclusion from the
Schecter case is to amend the Constitution, to limit the powers
of the Court, or to throw a conniption fit over the outcome.
Granted that the Court is legislating-granted that it is
more than legislating-that it is continuously amending the
Constitution. Granted if you will that in its constitutional
efforts, it is directly repealing the very Constitution the old
Tories are now engaged in howling about.
Yet if there were no such resiliency in our system to keep
the Constitution abreast of the times, then the grip of a document prepared nearly 150 years ago, within 90 days, by
some Colonial gentlemen in a hurry, who nearly all had some
direct, personal and pecuniary interest in the result, would
really become the chill grasp of mortmain-the dread clutch
of the dead hand.
I know of no better way to keep it vitalized than our own
system, including the Court.
I don't see how anybody can blame the Court for the outcome of the Schecter case. That case should have been
presented as Judge Brandeis used to present his cases when
he was arguing before the Court-on a purely factual basis
without the citation of a single precedent, disclosing beyond
question the overwhelming showing of the NRA experience
that national regulation of the problems of a nationalized
industry are a modern social economic necessity.
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Upon a proper showing, it is inconceivable that the Court
would deny to this nation a power shown requisite in every
other nation under the sun-to regulate its national commerce
nationally. That showing could be made in such a way as
to make it clear that the true touch stone is not whether a
thing directly or indirectly affects commerce among the states.
It is whether that thing substantially or insignificantly affects
that commerce.
That factual showing should present beyond question the
fact that degraded labor conditions within any state not only
can but almost invariably do seriously, and sometimes disruptively affect other states and concern more states than one.
I can't believe that a doctrine which leaves that situation
without a remedy will stand. I see no reason for a Constitutional amendment, the only purpose of which could be to
make the Constitution say what its framers intended it to
say in the beginning.
There is no occasion for any change in the powers or personnel of the Supreme Court of the United States. It is only
necessary to take there a proper case, properly presented, to
get that Court to underwrite and authorize the most obviously
necessary doctrine of our present political economy-a forthright acknowledgment of John Marshall's simple truth, "In
commerce we are one people."

